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[1] Technological innovations permeate almost every inch of society. 
From the government and corporate workforce to family and social 
settings, technology seemingly knows no boundaries.  Technology’s 
limitless reach has even crossed into the realm of public schools, where, 
according to teacher Lyn Newton, “[s]chool principals are witnessing 
more and more cell phone use by their teachers.”1  Teachers, like other 
cell phone users, use cell phones not only for making phone calls, but also 
for taking pictures and texting,2 which has landed some teachers in trouble 
                                                
*Joseph O. Oluwole, J.D., Ph.D., is an attorney-at-law and a professor of Education Law 
at Montclair State University. I would like to thank my graduate assistant Megan Raquet 
for her highly commendable assistance with this article. I am thankful to the editors and 
reviewers of the Richmond Journal of Law and Technology for their sedulous help with 
this article. 
 
1 Lyn Newton, Teacher Cell Phone Use at School, FAMILIES.COM, http://education. 
families.com/blog/teacher-cell-phone-use-at-school (last visited Jan. 6, 2010). 
 
2 See, e.g., Andra Varin, Sex Crime, Not Seduction: More Female Teachers Prosecuted 
for Having Sex With Students, AOLNEWS (Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.aolnews.com/story/ 
female-teachers-charged-with-sex-abuse/634372. 
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for inappropriate communications.3  Indeed, the sexting wave has not 
eluded teachers.4   
 
[2] The problems with cell phone technology become more 
pronounced when school-issued phones are used, particularly because 
school administrators may claim the right to seize and search said phones.5  
Yet, a vacuum in the adjudication of the search and seizure of teacher cell 
phones has left uncertainty concerning the legal parameters of the 
regulation of school-owned cell phones.  Furthermore, there is a clear lack 
of literature examining the constitutionality of searching public school 
teachers’ cell phones.  This Article attempts to fill the literary void 
through examination of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 City of Ontario v. 
Quon6 decision regarding the search and seizure of employer-provided 
devices.  
 
[3] Part II of this Article presents the facts of Quon.  Part III then 
discusses the Supreme Court’s decision with Parts IV and V examining 
Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion and Justice Scalia’s concurring 
opinion, respectively.  With the Quon decision firmly outlined, Part VI 
undertakes an examination of the status of teacher cell phones in public 
school districts.  Finally, Parts VII and VIII conclude with the implications 
of the Quon decision for the search and seizure of employer-provided 
teacher cell phones. 
 
II. THE FACTS IN ONTARIO V. QUON 
 
[4] Quon began after the Ontario Police Department (OPD), 
California, audited the text messages of police sergeant, and SWAT team 
                                                
3 See e.g., Varin, supra note 2. 
 
4 See id. 
 
5 See e.g., B.C. Manion, School Trying Cell Phones as Teacher’s Aid, TAMPA TRIB., Oct. 
22, 1996, at University/New Tampa 1.  For this article’s purposes, cell phones and pagers 
are synonymous, as was the case in the United States Supreme Court decision City of 
Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010).  
 
6 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
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member, Jeff Quon.7  The text messages were retrieved from one of the 
twenty OPD provided pagers given to OPD officers to help further the 
SWAT team’s work and facilitate responses to emergencies.8  OPD’s 
contract with Arch Wireless Operating Company, the wireless-service 
provider, limited the number of characters the pagers could send or receive 
monthly before incurring overage charges.9  Quon eclipsed the monthly 
character limit.10 
  
[5] While the OPD did not have a written policy specifically 
regulating employee use of cell phones or pagers, it had a general 
“Computer Usage, Internet and E-Mail Policy” (Computer Policy).11  This 
Computer Policy stated inter alia: “[the employer] reserves the right to 
monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use, 
with or without notice.  Users should have no expectation of privacy or 
confidentiality when using these resources.”12  Additionally, the OPD 
informed employees verbally and in a memorandum that text messages 
and e-mails would be treated similarly and subject to audit.13  In fact, the 
officers were told that text messages “‘are considered e-mail messages.’”14   
 
[6] Quon signed the Computer Policy, confirming that he had read and 
understood it.15  Quon was further reminded of this policy after he went 
over the character limit for his pager.16  But, at the same time he was told 
                                                
7 See id. at 2624. 
 
8 See id. at 2625. 
 
9 See id. 
 
10 See id. 
 




13 See id. 
 
14 Id. (citation omitted). 
 
15 See id. 
 
16 See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2625. 
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that there was no “‘intent to audit [an] employee’s text messages to see if 
the overage [was] due to work related transmissions.’”17  Ultimately, Quon 
was offered and accepted the opportunity to pay for his overages in lieu of 
an audit of his text messages.18  
 
[7] Because Quon and at least one other officer repeatedly went over 
their allotted character limit, the OPD chief launched an investigation to 
determine if the character allotment for text messages was insufficient.19  
Integral to its investigation, the OPD sought to determine if the overages 
were work-related or personal; such a determination was to ensure that 
employees were not paying out of pocket for work-related overages.20  As 
part of the inspection, the OPD examined the transcript of Quon’s text 
messages.21  The transcript revealed that not only were many of the text 
messages personal, but some were actually sexually explicit.22  This 
discovery prompted further internal investigations, which concluded that 
Quon violated OPD rules because he attended to personal affairs while on 
duty.23  
  
[8] Quon, along with several individuals who had sent him text 
messages, filed suit against the OPD and its officials claiming a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment’s Search and Seizure Clause.24  On a summary 
                                                
17 Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted). 
 
18 See id. (noting that other employees who incurred overages were offered the same 
opportunity). 
 
19 See id. at  2625-26. 
 
20 See id. at 2626. 
 
21 See id.  Arch Wireless provided the transcript, which were redacted to protect Quon’s 
off-duty text messages from review.  Id.  
 
22 See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2626. 
 
23 See id.  
 
24 See id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
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judgment motion, the federal district court for the Central District of 
California ruled for the OPD.25  Specifically, the district court held that 
even though Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text 
messages, the search itself was reasonable.26  The court ruled that the 
reasonableness of the search was contingent on the intent of the search, 
and consequently, referred the case to a jury to determine the OPD’s 
intent.27  The jury, ultimately, determined that the audit was intended to 
determine the sufficiency of the character allotment to the OPD’s 
employees.28  The court then reasoned that the search was constitutional in 
this case because the intent of the search was to evaluate the adequacy of 
the text character allotment, rather than to determine if Quon was abusing 
his pager.29  
 
[9] Like the district court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
that Quon had a reasonable privacy expectation in his text messages.30  
                                                                                                                     
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.”).  
 
25 See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1138, 1151 (C.D. 
Cal. 2006) [hereinafter Arch Wireless I]. 
 
26 See id. at 1143-46. 
 
27 See id. at 1146; see also Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 899 (9th 
Cir. 2008) [hereinafter Arch Wireless II]. 
 
28 See Arch Wireless II, 529 F.3d at 899; see also Arch Wireless I, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 
1146. 
 
29 See Arch Wireless I, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1146 (“[T]he Court finds that if the purpose for 
the audit was to determine if Quon was using his pager to ‘play games’ and ‘waste time,’ 
then the audit was not constitutionally reasonable, and performing the same violated the 
Fourth Amendment rights of Quon and those to whom he communicated.  On the other 
hand, if the purpose for the audit was to determine the efficacy of the existing character 
limits to ensure that officers were not paying hidden work-related costs, then the Court 
finds that no constitutional violation occurred.”); see also id. at 1144 (“Insofar as the 
audit was meant to ferret out misconduct by determining whether the officers in question 
were ‘playing games’ with their pagers or otherwise ‘wasting a lot of City time 
conversing with someone about non-related work issues,’ the Court finds the audit was 
not justified at its inception.”). 
 
30 See Arch Wireless II, 529 F.3d at 906. 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology        Vol. XVII, Issue 2 
 
 6 
However, the Ninth Circuit found the search unconstitutional because it 
was unreasonable in scope and there were other less intrusive ways to 
determine the efficacy of the character allotment, including having Quon 
himself redact the transcript.31  The Ninth Circuit ultimately denied a 
petition for an en banc review,32 and the U. S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.33 
 
III. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION 
 
[10] At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Fourth 
Amendment prohibits a public employer from searching the text messages 
employees send on employer-provided devices.34  The Court began its 
evaluation by emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment governs 
government action in its role as employer.35  The Court also observed that 
the Amendment’s reach is not limited to criminal investigations.36  In fact, 
at its core, the Amendment is designed to protect “‘the privacy, dignity, 
and security of persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by 
officers of the Government.’”37  To accentuate the fact that government 
                                                
31 See id. at 909 (“There were a host of simple ways to verify the efficacy of the 25,000 
character limit (if that, indeed, was the intended purpose) without intruding on [Quon’s] 
Fourth Amendment rights.  For example, the Department could have warned Quon that 
for the month of September he was forbidden from using his pager for personal 
communications, and that the contents of all of his messages would be reviewed to ensure 
the pager was used only for work-related purposes during that time frame.  Alternatively, 
if the Department wanted to review past usage, it could have asked Quon to count the 
characters himself, or asked him to redact personal messages and grant permission to the 
Department to review the redacted transcript.”). 
 
32 Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 554 F.3d 769, 769 (2009). 
 
33 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2627 (2010). 
 
34 See id. at 2628-29. 
 
35 See id. at 2627-28 (citing Treasury Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989)). 
 
36 See id. at 2627 (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967)). 
 
37 Id. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989)). 
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employers must comply with the Fourth Amendment, the Court relied on 
its decision in O’Connor v. Ortega.38   
 
[11] In O’Connor, officials at a state hospital searched the office of a 
physician employed at the hospital as part of an investigation into alleged 
work-related improprieties.39  In its review of the Fourth Amendment 
challenge to the search, the Court rejected the notion that “public 
employees can never have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
place of work.”40  Instead, the Court ruled that “[i]ndividuals do not lose 
Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government 
instead of a private employer.”41   
 
[12] According to a plurality in O’Connor, “[t]he operational realities 
of the workplace, however, may make some employees’ expectations of 
privacy unreasonable when an intrusion is by a supervisor rather than a 
law enforcement official.”42  In other words, contrary to Justice Scalia’s 
assertion in his O’Connor concurrence,43 there is no blanket Fourth 
                                                
38 Id. at 2628. 
 
39 See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 712-13 (1987). 
 




42 Id.; see also id. (“Public employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and 
file cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced 
by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation.”). 
 
43 See id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I cannot agree, moreover, with the plurality’s 
view that the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy (and thus the existence of 
Fourth Amendment protection) changes ‘when an intrusion is by a supervisor rather than 
a law enforcement official.’  The identity of the searcher (police v. employer) is relevant 
not to whether Fourth Amendment protections apply, but only to whether the search of a 
protected area is reasonable.  Pursuant to traditional analysis the former question must be 
answered on a more ‘global’ basis. . . . I would hold, therefore, that the offices of 
government employees, and a fortiori the drawers and files within those offices, are 
covered by Fourth Amendment protections as a general matter.”) (citation omitted).  
Justice Scalia would also apply a uniform standard to private and public employer 
searches.  See id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I would hold that government searches 
to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules – 
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Amendment protection for government employees’ offices.44  Instead, the 
O’Connor plurality ruled that inquiry into the “operational realities of the 
workplace” is a condition precedent to determining the existence of Fourth 
Amendment rights in the workplace.45  Additionally, the Court declared 
that the “operational realities of the workplace” create “special needs, 
beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” which exempt employer-
conducted searches from the Amendment’s probable cause and warrant 
requirements.46   
 
[13] Approximately two years after O’Connor, the Supreme Court 
nominally clarified the role of “operational realities” in the Fourth 
Amendment analysis of workplace searches.47  Specifically, the Court 
ruled that, rather than exclusively serving as a condition precedent to 
existence of Fourth Amendment rights, “operational realities” could 
“diminish privacy expectations” of public employees.48 
  
                                                                                                                     
searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer 
context – do not violate the Fourth Amendment.”).  
 
44 See id. at 717-18; see also City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2628 (2010) 
(interpreting O’Connor’s plurality opinion as requiring a case-by-case decision as 
opposed to Justice Scalia’s blanket view). 
 
45 See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 717; see also Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2628 (“[A] court must 
consider [t]he operational realities of the workplace in order to determine whether an 
employee's Fourth Amendment rights are implicated . . . .”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
46 See O’Connor, 480 U.S.. at 725 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 
(1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)); see also Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630. 
 
47 See Treasury Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671 (1989). 
 
48 Id. at 671; see also id. (“Employees of the United States Mint, for example, should 
expect to be subject to certain routine personal searches when they leave the workplace 
every day.  Similarly, those who join our military or intelligence services may not only be 
required to give what in other contexts might be viewed as extraordinary assurances of 
trustworthiness and probity, but also may expect intrusive inquiries into their physical 
fitness for those special positions.”).  
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[14] A majority of the O’Connor Court ruled that a standard of 
reasonableness must govern workplaces searches.49  The Justices reasoned 
that “[a] standard of reasonableness will neither unduly burden the efforts 
of government employers to ensure the efficient and proper operation of 
the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of 
public employees.”50  This reasonableness standard for “public employer 
intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of 
government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as 
well as for investigations of work-related misconduct”51 demands that 
searches must be reasonable at inception and in scope.52  Namely, under 
this two-step reasonableness standard, courts must first determine if the 
search was justified at its inception, and then determine if “the search as 
actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 
which justified the interference in the first place.”53  
 
[15] The Quon Court chose not to establish or endorse a “threshold test 
for determining the scope of an employee’s Fourth Amendment rights.”54  
More specifically, the Court decided not to choose between the O’Connor 
plurality’s position, which argued there should be no blanket Fourth 
Amendment protection for workplace searches,55 and that of Justice 
Scalia, who argued there should be a uniform standard for searches by 
public and private employers.56  The Court’s rationale was that Quon was 
                                                
49 See O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 725. 
 
50 Id.; see also id. at 726 (“Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the 
scope of the intrusion must be reasonable . . . .”). 
 
51 Id. at 725. 
 
52 See id. at 726. 
 
53 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)); see also O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726. 
 
54 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2628 (2010). 
 
55 See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717-18 (1987). 
 
56 See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
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not the case for such a choice since both approaches lead to the same 
conclusion: the search was reasonable.57   
 
[16] The Court was also hesitant to use Quon as a test case for further 
development of O’Connor due to the dynamic nature of technology, the 
highly undeveloped state of the laws governing the interaction of 
technology and privacy, and the unpredictability of societal norms about 
proper technological etiquette.58  The Court instead chose to 
foundationally assume that the review of Quon’s text messages constituted 
a Fourth Amendment search; and that Quon had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the text messages.59  The Court acknowledged, however, the 
parties’ disagreement over whether Quon even had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.60  The petitioners contended that Quon had no 
reasonable privacy expectation because the OPD informed its employees 
that text messages were governed by the computer policy and that text 
messages were not deemed private.61  The respondents countered, arguing 
that an OPD official’s verbal statement to Quon—that his text messages 
would not be audited if he paid his overages—countermanded the official 
                                                
57 See id. at 2628-29. 
 
58 See id. at 2629-30.  For instance, the Court pointed out that “[r]apid changes in the 
dynamics of communication and information transmission are evident not just in the 
technology itself but in what society accepts as proper behavior. . . . At present, it is 
uncertain how workplace norms, and the law's treatment of them, will evolve.”  Id. at 
2630 (emphasis added). 
 
59 See id. at 2630.  The Court also assumed that the same Fourth Amendment limitations 
that apply to the search of physical space also apply to the search of electronics.  Here are 
the three main assumptions of the Court overarching its review, in the Court’s own 
words: “For present purposes we assume several propositions arguendo: First, Quon had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages sent on the pager provided to 
him by the City; second, petitioners' review of the transcript constituted a search within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; and third, the principles applicable to a 
government employer’s search of an employee's physical office apply with at least the 
same force when the employer intrudes on the employee’s privacy in the electronic 
sphere.”  Id. 
 
60 See id. at 2629. 
 
61 See id. 
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policy; consequently, respondents reasoned, Quon had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.62   
 
[17] In detailed dicta, the Court revealed that if it were to determine the 
legitimacy of Quon’s expectation of privacy pursuant to O’Connor, it 
would need to conduct an “operational realities” inquiry.63  This inquiry 
would have to include the following determinations: (1) whether the 
verbal statements of the OPD official constituted a change in official 
policy; (2) if the first question is answered in the affirmative, then it must 
be determined whether the OPD official had actual authority or the color 
of authority to: (i) institute the change; and (ii) “guarantee the privacy of 
text messaging[;]”64 and (3) other reasons that would justify or excuse 
auditing text messages sent on employer-provided pagers or cell phones 
during work hours.65  Such justifications/excuses would include audits for 
performance evaluations, audits pursuant to litigation about the legality of 
government actions as well as audits necessary to comply with state open 
records laws.66 
 
[18] The Court appeared a little apprehensive in its review of the Fourth 
Amendment implications of text messages on employer-provided 
communication devices.  This is evident in the Court’s use of such 
cautionary phrases as “proceed with care”, “judiciary risks error” and 
“[p]rudence counsels caution” in its opinion.67  For instance, the Court 
                                                






65 See id. 
 
66 See id. 
 
67 Id.  The Court acknowledged that, while it was able to rely on “its own knowledge and 
experience” to find a reasonable privacy expectation in phone booths in Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
353 (1967), the same could not be said for pagers or cell phones.  See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 
2629 (“In Katz, the Court relied on its own knowledge and experience to conclude that 
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth.  It is not so clear that 
courts at present are on so sure a ground.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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noted that “[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the 
Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in 
society has become clear.”68  Likewise, the Court observed that  
 
[e]ven if the Court were certain that the O’Connor 
plurality’s approach were the right one, the Court would 
have difficulty predicting how employees’ privacy 
expectations will be shaped by those changes [i.e. 
workplace norms, technological changes and the law’s 
evolution in response to increased technology use at work] 
or the degree to which society will be prepared to recognize 
those expectations as reasonable.69   
 
Ironically, in the Court’s eagerness to avoid uncertainty, it might have 
created more uncertainty in the law due to its failure to settle the law; 
indeed, the Court itself acknowledged the current pendent state of the 
law.70  
  
[19] In light of the Court’s decision not to choose between the 
O’Connor plurality’s approach and Justice Scalia’s approach, the Court 
applied both approaches to show that they lead to the same conclusion.71  
However, most of the Court’s reasonableness analysis was conducted 
under the O’Connor plurality’s two-step reasonableness standard.72  
                                                
68 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2629 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2630 (“A broad holding 
concerning employees’ privacy expectations vis-à-vis employer-provided technological 
equipment might have implications for future cases that cannot be predicted.”). 
 
69 Id. at 2630. 
 
70 See id. at 2629-30.  Justice Scalia agrees, as he aptly characterized this refusal to clarify 
the law as “self-defeating.”  Id. at 2635 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment). 
 
71 See id. at 2630-33. 
 
72 See id. at 2630.  The two-part standard requires that: (i) the search was “justified at its 
inception”; and (ii) “the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”   O’Connor v. 
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)). 
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[20] Under the O’Connor analysis, the Court found that the OPD’s 
procurement and review of the text messages were “justified at [their] 
inception because there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the 
search [was] necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose.”73  
The Court reasoned that the intent of the audit of Quon’s messages – 
evaluation of the adequacy of employees’ text character allotment74 – 
constituted a “noninvestigatory work-related purpose.”75  In accordance 
with this reasoning, the Court concluded that the petitioners “had a 
legitimate interest in ensuring that employees were not being forced to pay 
out of their own pockets for work-related expenses, or on the other hand 
that the City [of Ontario] was not paying for extensive personal 
communications.”76  
  
[21] Under the second step of the O’Connor reasonableness standard, 
the Court found the scope of the search reasonable.77  As justification, the 
Court cited the efficiency and expediency of text message reviews to the 
petitioners’ audit intent.78  Further, the Court found the scope of the search 
reasonable because it was “not ‘excessively intrusively.’”79  This 
conclusion was supported by the OPD’s deliberate efforts to redact text 
messages that Quon sent while he was off-duty, as well as the OPD’s 
decision to review texts for only two of the months that Quon incurred 
overages.80  Additionally, the Court declared that there are varying degrees 
                                                
73 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2631 (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
74 See id.; Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 899 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(discussing the jury determination of the audit’s intent).  
 




77 See id. 
 
78 See id. 
 
79 Id. (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987)). 
 
80 See id.  The Supreme Court acknowledged that the OPD might have reasonable 
grounds to review text messages for all the months that Quon incurred overages.  See id. 
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of reasonable expectations of privacy, and the degree of expectation is 
relevant to the intrusiveness and, consequently, scope of analysis.81  For 
instance, the Court pointed out that Quon had a relatively low expectation 
of privacy because he was informed in the official policy that his messages 
could be audited.82  Therefore, the Court reasoned that Quon could not 
have had such a high expectation of privacy as to justify a belief that he 
had carte blanche immunity from an audit of his messages.83  
  
[22] The Court also revealed that Quon’s role as a law enforcement 
officer played a key role in diminishing his expectation of privacy: “As a 
law enforcement officer, he would or should have known that his actions 
were likely to come under legal scrutiny, and that this might entail an 
analysis of his on-the-job communications.”84  In fact, the Court intimated 
that, law enforcement officer or not, the expectation of privacy would 
diminish for any employee if the employer provided the pager or cell 
phone, and if the employee was informed that text messages are subject to 
audit or the employee “received no assurances of privacy.”85  The Court 
reasoned that, given these circumstances, “a reasonable employee would 
be aware that sound management principles might require the audit of 
messages to determine whether the pager was being appropriately used.”86  
Accordingly, the Court concluded that Quon’s expectation of privacy was 
“only a limited privacy expectation,” 87 though the Court declined to 
                                                
81 See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2631 (citing Treasury Emps. v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671 
(1989); cf. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-57 (1995)) 
(“Furthermore, and again on the assumption that Quon had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the contents of his messages, the extent of an expectation is relevant to 
assessing whether the search was too intrusive.”).  
 
82 See id. 
 








87 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2631. 
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further delineate or clarify the boundaries of the limitations.88 
Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the limited nature of Quon’s privacy 
expectation reduced the intrusiveness of the search.89 
  
[23] Finally, in its reasonable in scope analysis, the Court rejected the 
Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that, since there were less intrusive ways to 
conduct the search, the search was unreasonable.90  Specifically, the Court 
pointed out that “[t]his approach was inconsistent with controlling 
precedents.”91  The Court observed that it had “repeatedly refused to 
declare that only the ‘least intrusive’ search practicable can be reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.”92  The Court reasoned that the “least 
intrusive” approach would insurmountably impede “virtually all search-
and-seizure powers.”93 Indeed, as the Court noted, under the “least 
intrusive” approach, judicial imagination of alternatives to any employer 
searches or seizures would be limitless.94  Applying these principles, the 
                                                
88 See id. 
 
89 See id. at 2631-32 (“From OPD’s perspective, the fact that Quon likely had only a 
limited privacy expectation, with boundaries that we need not here explore, lessened the 
risk that the review would intrude on highly private details of Quon’s life.  OPD’s audit 
of messages on Quon's employer-provided pager was not nearly as intrusive as a search 
of his personal e-mail account or pager, or a wiretap on his home phone line, would have 
been.  That the search did reveal intimate details of Quon’s life does not make it 
unreasonable, for under the circumstances a reasonable employer would not expect that 
such a review would intrude on such matters.  The search was permissible in its scope.”). 
 




92 Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
93 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2632 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 
n.12 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
94 Id. (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “[J]udges 
engaged in post hoc evaluations of government conduct can almost always imagine some 
alternative means by which the objectives of the government might have been 
accomplished.” Id. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9 
(1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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Court ruled that the OPD did not have to use less intrusive means, 
including having Quon redact his personal messages or asking him to 
conduct the audit himself.95   
 
[24] The Court also rejected respondent’s argument that statutory 
prohibition of a search makes a search “per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.”96  The Court concluded its reasonableness analysis 
by pointing out that the search of Quon’s text messages would pass muster 
under Justice Scalia’s O’Connor approach.97   
  
[25] Under Justice Scalia’s approach, the Fourth Amendment would 
apply generally to Quon’s text messages, and uniform standards would 
apply to employer searches of private and public employees.98  The Court 
stated that the search of the text messages would be reasonable in the 
private sector since it was designed for legitimate work-related 
investigations and not overly intrusive.99  Accordingly, the search of 
                                                
95 See id.  The Court also indicated, in rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s decision, that the 
OPD did not have to forewarn “‘Quon that for the month of September he was forbidden 
from using his pager for personal communications, and that the contents of all his 
messages would be reviewed to ensure the pager was used only for work-related purposes 
during that time frame.”  Id. (quoting Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 
892, 909 (9th Cir. 2008)).   The Court concluded that “[e]ven assuming there were ways 
that OPD could have performed the search that would have been less intrusive, it does not 
follow that the search as conducted was unreasonable.”  Id. (emphasis added).  In other 
words, the presence of less intrusive means is not a determinative factor in analyzing the 
reasonableness of a search.  See id. 
 
96 Id. (citing Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168 (2008); California v. Greenwood, 486 
U.S. 35, 43 (1988)). 
 
97 See id. 2633.  Recall, under Justice Scalia’s approach in O’Connor, “the offices of 
government employees, and a fortiori the drawers and files within those offices, are 
covered by Fourth Amendment protections as a general matter. . . . I would hold that 
government searches to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of 
workplace rules – searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the 
private-employer context – do not violate the Fourth Amendment.”  O’Connor v. Ortega, 
480 U.S. 709, 731-32 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).   
 
98 See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2628 (citing O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 731-32 (Scalia, J., 
concurring)). 
 
99 See id. at 2632-33. 
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Quon’s text messages – designed for a legitimate work-related 
investigation and not excessively intrusive – was reasonable under Justice 
Scalia’s approach.100 
 
[26] The respondents argued that the Search and Seizure Clause also 
protected those who sent Quon text messages.101  A sine qua non of such 
protection, however, is a determination that persons who knowingly send 
text messages to employer-provided devices have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the messages.102  The Court refused to rule on the 
respondents’ argument because it was possible to dispose of the case 
without examining this question.103  Besides, the respondents contended 
that if the search of Quon was unreasonable, the search must necessarily 
be “unreasonable as to his correspondents.”104  But, they failed to argue 
the corollary position that if the search of Quon’s messages was 
reasonable, the search of his correspondents’ messages must also 
necessarily be reasonable.105  Consequently, the Court reasoned that this 
wanting “litigating position,” as well as the Court’s finding that the search 
of Quon’s messages was reasonable, “necessarily” precluded Quon’s 
correspondents from prevailing.106  The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit 




                                                
100 See id. at 2633. 
 
101 See id. 
 
102 See id. 
 
103 See id. 
 
104 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2633. 
 
105 See id. 
 
106 Id. (“In light of this litigating position and the Court’s conclusion that the search was 
reasonable as to Jeff Quon, it necessarily follows that these other respondents cannot 
prevail.”) (emphasis added).  
 
107 Id.   
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IV.  JUSTICE STEVENS’ CONCURRING OPINION 
  
[27] While Justice Stevens completely agreed with the Court’s 
opinion, he wrote a concurring opinion to underscore the wisdom of the 
Court’s refusal to choose between the O’Connor plurality’s approach and 
that of Justice Scalia as the test for determining the reasonable privacy 
expectations of employees.108  According to Justice Stevens, O’Connor 
actually presents a third approach: an ad hoc determination of employees’ 
reasonable expectations of privacy based on the nature of the search.109  
He observed that Justice Blackmun propounded this approach in his 
dissenting opinion for four Justices in O’Connor.110  There, Justice 
Blackmun declared, “the precise extent of an employee’s expectation of 
privacy often turns on the nature of the search.”111  The rationale for this 
ad hoc approach lies in the absence of “tidy distinctions” between private 
and workplace activities in this day and age.112  Consequently, Justice 
Stevens reasoned that the degree of privacy expectations should be 
determined “in light of the specific facts of each particular search, rather 
than by announcing a categorical standard.”113  
                                                
108 See id. (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 
109 See id. (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 
110 See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2633 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 
111 O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 738 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).  
 
112  Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 739 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting)); see also O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 739 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
reality of work in modern time, whether done by public or private employees, reveals 
why a public employee’s expectation of privacy in the workplace should be carefully 
safeguarded and not lightly set aside.  It is, unfortunately, all too true that the workplace 
has become another home for most working Americans.  Many employees spend the 
better part of their days and much of their evenings at work. . . . Consequently, an 
employee’s private life must intersect with the workplace, for example, when the 
employee takes advantage of work or lunch breaks to make personal telephone calls, to 
attend to personal business, or to receive personal visitors in the office.  As a result, the 
tidy distinctions (to which the plurality alludes) between the workplace and professional 
affairs, on the one hand, and personal possessions and private activities, on the other, do 
not exist in reality.”) (citations omitted). 
 
113 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2633 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citing O’Connor, 
480 U.S. at 741 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).  
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[28] Withal, Justice Stevens concluded that even under the third 
approach, the search of Quon’s text messages was reasonable for the very 
same reasons the Court relied on in reaching the same conclusion: Quon 
had only a limited privacy expectation because the facts showed that he 
should have known that his employer-provided device was subject to 
audit.114  
 
V.  JUSTICE SCALIA’S CONCURRING OPINION 
 
[29] Justice Scalia, a critical voice in the O’Connor decision, filed an 
opinion concurring in part with the Quon Court’s opinion and concurring 
wholly with the judgment.115  Justice Scalia’s rationale for his separate 
opinion was his continued support for a uniform standard for searches 
conducted by private employers and public employers.116  Specifically, 
Justice Scalia stated, “the proper threshold inquiry should be not whether 
the Fourth Amendment applies to messages on public employees’ 
employer-issued pagers, but whether it applies in general to such 
messages on employer-issued pagers.”117  
 
[30] While Justice Scalia reaffirmed his rejection of the O’Connor 
plurality’s “operational realities” framework for analyzing public 
                                                
114  See id. at 2633-34 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“For the reasons stated at page 13 of the 
Court’s opinion, it is clear that respondent Jeff Quon, as a law enforcement officer who 
served on a SWAT Team, should have understood that all of his work-related actions – 
including all of his communications on his official pager – were likely to be subject to 
public and legal scrutiny.  He therefore had only a limited expectation of privacy in 
relation to this particular audit of his pager messages.  Whether one applies the reasoning 
from Justice O'Connor’s opinion, [Justice Scalia’s] concurrence, or Justice Blackmun’s 
dissent in O'Connor, the result is the same: The judgment of the Court of Appeals in this 
case must be reversed.”). 
 
115 See id. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also 
O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 729-32 (Scalia, J., concurring).   
 
116 See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (finding that the O’Connor plurality’s standard for determining the Fourth 
Amendment’s application to public employees is “standardless and unsupported”). 
 
117 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (alterations in 
original).  
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employer searches,118 he agreed with the Quon Court’s refusal to use this 
as the test case for choosing between his O’Connor approach and that of 
the plurality.119  Like the Court, he reasoned that even if it were assumed 
that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the search was 
reasonable and “[t]hat should end the matter.”120  But he chided the Court 
for “inexplicably interrupt[ing] its analysis with . . . an excursus on the 
complexity and consequences of answering, [an] admittedly irrelevant 
threshold question,” in light of the Court’s acknowledgment that the case 
could be disposed of without further clarifying O’Connor.121  He warned 
the Court that its excessive discussion of the O’Connor plurality’s 
approach would inspire a “heavy-handed” posture in the lower courts and 
excite litigants to flood the courts with cases.122  
 
[31] Justice Scalia also admonished the Court for foregoing the 
opportunity to further illuminate the constitutional parameters of 
workplace electronic communication.123  He criticized the Court for 
                                                
118 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 
119 See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 
120 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 
121 See id. at 2634-35 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
Questioning the Court’s decision, Justice Scalia asked wittingly, “To whom do we owe 
an additional explanation for declining to decide an issue, once we have explained that it 
makes no difference?”  Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  
 
122 See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2635 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“Litigants will do likewise, using the threshold question whether the Fourth 
Amendment is even implicated as a basis for bombarding lower courts with arguments 
about employer policies, how they were communicated, and whether they were 
authorized, as well as the latest trends in employees’ use of electronic media.”). 
 
123 See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The Court’s 
inadvertent boosting of the O’Connor plurality’s standard is all the more ironic because, 
in fleshing out its fears that applying the test to new technologies will be too hard, the 
Court underscores the unworkability of that standard.  Any rule that requires evaluating 
whether a given gadget is a ‘necessary instrumen[t] for self-expression, even self-
identification,’ on top of assessing the degree to which ‘the law’s treatment of [workplace 
norms has] evolve[d],’ is (to put it mildly) unlikely to yield objective answers.”) (citation 
omitted).  
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justifying its refusal with the rationale of the unpredictable nature of 
technology: 
 
Applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies may 
sometimes be difficult, but when it is necessary to decide a 
case we have no choice.  The Court’s implication . . . that 
where electronic privacy is concerned we should decide 
less than we otherwise would (that is, less than the 
principle of law necessary to resolve the case and guide 
private action) – or that we should hedge our bets by 
concocting case-specific standards or issuing opaque 
opinions – is in my view indefensible.  The-times-they-are-
a-changin’ is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty.124 
 
Justice Scalia concluded his opinion by castigating the Court for its 
eschewal, arguing that it would fuel further uncertainty in the lower 
courts.125  He might be right, but certainly only time will tell. 
 
VI. TEACHERS AND THE INCIDENCE OF CELL PHONES AT SCHOOL 
 
A.  Overview of the Posture of Teacher Cell Phones in Public Schools 
 
[32] Recently, public schools have begun providing their teachers with 
cell phones.126  For example, in partnership with GTE Mobilnet, Broward 
Elementary School in Florida provided cell phones to its teachers as part 
of a program designed to enhance the communication between students’ 
families and the school.127  With the increased availability of cell phones 
in public schools, a growing debate has developed between teachers and 
                                                
124 Quon, 130 S.Ct. at 2635 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). See supra Part II (arguing that the Court might actually create more instability 
and uncertainty in the law by failing to clarify the law).  
 
125 See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (finding that the 
Court “underscores the unworkability of that standard” to yield objective answers). 
 
126 See, e.g., Manion, supra note 5.  
 
127 See id. 
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administrators over the permissible scope of teachers’ cell phone use and 
the power of schools to regulate their use.128  According to a Florida 
principal, the expanded availability of cell phones to teachers is “one of 
the last taboos in education.”129  
 
[33] Some educators contend that public schools should permit teachers 
to use cell phones during school hours as a matter of convenience.130  For 
example, cell phones afford teachers the opportunity to return parent calls, 
or follow up with ill students or those with disciplinary issues.131  Deirdre 
Fernandes of the Virginian-Pilot aptly observed that “[w]hen it comes to 
student discipline, the cell phone is emerging as the teacher’s most feared 
- and effective - tool of choice.  And it doesn’t even have to be turned 
on.”132   
 
[34] This practice, known as “dialing for discipline,” has received great 
reviews from teachers who use it as a “stick.”133  Eighth grade teacher 
Carolyn Smith has noticed “she need only hold the phone up, fingers 
poised on the keypad, to subdue an unruly student.”134  The cell phone, 
coupled with the horrifying words “Your mother wants to talk to you,” 
helped instill discipline in her class.135  Smith described this discipline 
approach as a “watershed.”136  Laurian Bascay, a 13-year old student at 
                                                
128 See, e.g., Newton, supra note 1. 
 
129 Manion, supra note 5 (quoting Beverly DeMott, Principal, Broward Elementary 
School). 
 
130 See, e.g., Newton, supra note 1. 
 
131 See id. 
 
132 Deirdre Fernandes, Local Teachers Use Cell Phones as Type of Discipline; They May 
Call Parents When Problems Arise, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Aug. 28, 2003, at A1. 
 
133 See id.  Some teachers, however, prefer the old-fashioned form of discipline, which 
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Western Branch Middle School in Chesapeake, Virginia, revealed the 
“power of the cell phone” when she indicated that the immediate threat of 
a call to her parents instantly inspired her to stop disrupting her class.137 
 
[35] First grade teacher Linda Lynch pointed out another benefit of 
providing teachers with cell phones by saying, “[i]f a child gets hurt on the 
playground, help can be summoned instantly.  You don’t have to worry 
about running for help.  You can call 911 right away.”138  Kindergarten 
teacher LuAnn Apple used her cell phone to create an innovative program 
called Senior Telephone Pals (STP), which incorporates cell phones into 
her pedagogy.139  Under STP, students connect with senior citizens for 
weekly five-minute phone conversations and picture sharing sessions to 
learn language skills and life experiences from their elders.140  Further, 
access to cell phones ensures that teachers can make important calls from 
the classroom without leaving the students unattended.141   
 
[36] But, some teachers use phones for personal calls such as hair and 
doctor appointments.142  Consequently, various schools have opted to 
police teacher cell phone use, restricting use to lunch or other breaks 
during the school day.143  For example, South Jackson Elementary School 
in Georgia restricts teacher use of cell phones to planning time or 
breaks.144  Additionally, the school prohibits teachers from using cell 
                                                
137 Id. “‘I stopped,’ the rising eighth-grader said. ‘Nobody likes to get their parents 
called.’” Id. (quoting Laurian Bascay, Student, Western Branch Middle School). 
 
138 Manion, supra note 5 (quoting Linda Lynch, First Grade Teacher, Broward 




140 See id. 
 
141 See, e.g., Newton, supra note 1. 
 
142 See, e.g., Manion, supra note 5; accord Newton, supra note 1. 
 
143 See JACKSON CNTY. SCH. SYS., SOUTH JACKSON ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHER 
HANDBOOK 15 (2004), available at http://www.jackson.k12.ga.us/sjes/sjes_teacher_ 
handbook_fall_2004.pdf. 
 
144 See id. 
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phones when supervising or teaching students.145  Even in emergencies, 
cell phone use is limited to office staff and administrative personnel.146  
Largo High School in Florida admonishes teachers to keep personal calls 
to a minimum.147  The faculty handbook for Wisconsin Dells (WD) High 
School states in pertinent part: “Modeling the WD WAY is an essential 
factor in creating an effective classroom environment.  Therefore, teaching 
staff should not use cell phones during instructional time.”148  But, not 
everyone is thrilled about the regulation of teacher cell phones.  During his 
tenure as president of the Virginia Beach Education Association, Jeff 
Cobb was apathetic about teacher cell phone regulation and expressed the 
union’s opposition.149  
 
[37] Despite the regulations, some teachers disregard school cell phone 
policies and essentially model improper behavior for their students.150  
Evaluating these improper role models, Carol Bengle Gilbert, an award 
leading Associated Content education writer and legal commentator, 
declared:  
 
What distresses me about cell phone use in the classroom is 
not what the children might do – the teachers are there to 
supervise them and enforce the rules after all.  No, it’s the 
teachers who concern me. . . . It seems that teachers who 
expect children to respect them by paying attention and not 
                                                
145 Id. 
 
146 See id.  But cf. BOWIE INDEP. SCH. DIST., BOWIE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL FACULTY 
HANDBOOK 2008-2009, at 15 (2008), available at http://es.bowieisd.net/pdf/Faculty_ 
handbook_08-09.pdf (allowing cell phone use in emergency situations). 
 
147 See LARGO HIGH SCH., LARGO HIGH SCHOOL TEACHER HANDBOOK 1914-2011, at 19 
(2010), available at http://www.largo-hs.pinellas.k12.fl.us/Staff/TeacherHandbook.pdf. 
 
148 WIS. DELLS HIGH SCH., WIS. DELLS HIGH SCHOOL FACULTY HANDBOOK 2010-2011 
(2010), available at http://www.sdwd.k12.wi.us/highschool/2010-11_Faculty_ 
Handbook.pdf. 
 
149 See Fernandes, supra note 132. 
 
150 See, e.g., Newton, supra note 1. 
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using cell phones in class do not feel the same compulsion 
to model respectful behavior by spending their teaching 
hours focused on the children rather than their cells.151  
 
She reported that her children often came home with complaints about 
teachers chatting during class time on cell phones.152  Indeed, students 
often see a double standard when their cell phones are regulated, while the 
teachers’ are not.153  For instance, a frustrated fifteen-year old Amy 
Gomes declared: “If their cell phone rings, it interrupts the class.  If the 
rule isn’t the same for them, it’s not fair.”154  In retort, some schools 
contend that because teachers are adults, their cell phones do not need to 
be regulated.155  
 
[38] There is likewise a taxpayer concern with unregulated teacher cell 
phone use: “[a]re the taxpayers paying public school teachers to chat on 
the phone or attend to personal business during class time?”156  
Particularly in this period of economic distress, and with teachers’ 
widespread complaints about the inadequacy of time to effectively educate 
students, calls for audits of work time cell phone use are not infrequent.157 
  
[39] Teachers also have faced disciplinary action and even criminal 
charges for texting students, providing a possible rationale for searches of 
teachers’ cell phones.  In Texas, a thirty-four-year old elementary school 
                                                
151 Carol Bengle Gilbert, Cell Phones in Classrooms? It’s the Teachers Talking, 
ASSOCIATED CONTENT (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/ 
2023232/cell_phones_in_classrooms_its_the_teachers.html?cat=4 (emphasis added). 
 
152 See id. 
 
153 See, e.g., Kimberly Atkins, Students Say Cell Phone Ban Doesn’t Ring True for 
Teachers, BOS. HERALD, Oct. 28, 2005, at News 6. 
 
154 Id. (quoting Amy Gomes, Student, Charlestown High School). 
 
155 See id. 
 
156 Gilbert, supra note 151. 
 
157 See id. 
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teacher sent a text message stating “U suck” to her ten-year old student, 
who responded: “So do you.”158  The student’s stepparent discovered the 
array of text messages on his son’s cell phone, mistakenly assuming that 
they were merely chatter among fifth-graders.159  This event represents a 
prime example of a teacher violating the bounds of appropriate teacher-
student conduct.160  According to Stop Educator Sexual Abuse, 
Misconduct and Exploitation (SESAME), the explosion of teacher cell 
phones and texting in schools presents challenges since it gives teachers 
“24-hour access” to students.161  While, as SESAME points out, the 
evidence trail preserved by cell phones in cases of misconduct is 
remarkable, it is not surprising that this teacher claimed that someone used 
her cell phone to text the student without her knowledge.162  
  
B.  Teachers and the Growing Incidence of Sexting 
 
[40] With increasing use of cellular phones, sexting is a growing 
concern across the country.163  This practice, involving the transmission of 
graphic messages via cell phones, is particularly appalling when it entails 
teacher-student communications.164  For example, a math teacher in New 
                                                
158 Lindsay Kastner, What Happens When Teachers Text Students?, SAN ANTONIO 
EXPRESS-NEWS, Nov. 19, 2009, at 1A. 
 
159 See id. Following a period of administrative leave, the Texas teacher mentioned above 
ultimately resigned. See id. 
 
160 See id. 
 
161 Id. (quoting Terri Miller, President, Stop Educator Sexual Abuse, Misconduct and 
Exploitation). 
 
162 See id. 
 
163 See e.g., Amanda Lenhart, Teens and Sexting, How and Why Minor Teens Are Sending 
Sexually Suggestive Nude or Nearly Nude Images Via Text Messaging, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER, 2-3 (2009), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/ 
2009/PIP_Teens_and_Sexting.pdf. 
 
164 See, e.g., David F. Capeless, Sexting, BERKSHIRE DISTRICT ATTORNEY, 
http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=berhomepage&L=1&L0=Home&sid=Dber (follow 
“Crime Awareness & Prevention” hyperlink; then follow “Parents & Youth” hyperlink; 
then follow “Sexting” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 9, 2010). 
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Jersey lost his job in 2009 after two female students complained about his 
unbecoming graphic text messages.165  In Mississippi that same year, an 
assistant football coach was terminated and arrested for texting a sexual 
image of himself to a female student.166  Additionally, a forty-one year old 
teacher in New Hampshire, dubbed the “Sexting Teacher,” was charged 
with a felony for transmitting nude pictures of herself via cell phone to a 
fifteen-year old student.167  The teacher’s sexting was disclosed only after 
the student showed the graphic texts to his friend out of utter 
excitement.168  Similarly, a teacher in Florida was charged with 
transmitting pornography with an electronic device and transmitting 
harmful material to a minor, when she sent sexually explicit images of 
herself to an eighth grader.169  This incident was reported as “just the latest 
in a number of recent arrests involving sexting, the dissemination of 
pornographic messages a la naked pictures via cellphones.”170  
  
[41] In 2010, a thirty-six year old teacher in Indiana resigned after he 
was exposed for sending several sexual text messages to various 
cheerleaders.171  In one of his texts to a fourteen-year old cheerleader, the 
                                                
165 See Kastner, supra note 158.           
                                                                
166 See id. 
 
167 Roz Zurko, Sexting Teacher - Melinda Dennehy - From Londonderry New 
Hampshire– Sexting Pictures, The Sexting Teacher – Melinda Dennehy – Out on Bail – 




168 See id. 
 
169 See Saul Relative, Teacher Christy Lynn Martin Arrested, Caught Sexting 8th Grade 






171 See Andrew Greiner, Indiana Teacher Accused of Sexting 8th Grade Cheerleaders, 
“How About U Tell Me the ‘Bad’ Stuff U Do?”, NBC CHI. (Mar. 5, 2010, 8:45 AM), 
http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local-beat/Indiana-Teacher-Accused-of-Sexting-8th-
Grade-Cheerleaders-86587952.html. 
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teacher wrote, “Something tells me ur not the goody good yur mom thinks 
ur. I can be tempted to play Ru tempting?”172  Consequently, the student 
was granted a protective order against the teacher and the police were 
called in to investigate.173  Furthermore, a teacher had to register as a sex 
offender with the state of Tennessee, after pleading guilty to four sexual 
offense counts stemming from sexting female students.174  One of the 
students indicated that the teacher sought to “see more skin” after she 
texted him her photograph.175  The school district suspended the thirty-
seven year old teacher and as a result, he is no longer permitted to teach 
kindergarten through high school.176  
  
[42] Recently, a twenty-nine year old teacher in New York was indicted 
for sending inappropriate texts to a student, including a text reading, 
“Naked photos please.”177  Similarly, a teacher in Washington resigned 
after she was accused of texting her student inappropriately.178  Moreover, 
another teacher was arrested and charged in Washington that same year 
for “communicating with a minor for immoral purposes.”179  During a 
2010 judicial proceeding in North Carolina, a thirty-eight year old teacher 
                                                
172 Id.  While the texting began innocently, the texts became inappropriate once the 
teacher asked the girl, “’Why don’t u think ur hot?’ . . . . ‘Well ur way sexy for a lil girl’ . 
. . . ‘How about u tell me the ‘bad’ stuff u do?’”  Id.  
 
173 See id. 
 
174 See Assoc. Press, Tennessee Teacher Admits ‘Sexting’ Two Teenage Students, 





176 See id. 
 
177 See Assoc. Press, New York Teacher Accused of Soliciting Text Sex From Female 
Student, FOX NEWS.COM  (Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 
0,2933,486024,00.html. 
 
178 See Kastner, supra note 158. 
 
179 Teacher Accused of Sexting Student, Police Arrest Substitute Castle Rock Teacher, 
KPTV.COM (May 16, 2009, 1:41 PM), http://www.kptv.com/news/19481429/detail.html. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology        Vol. XVII, Issue 2 
 
 29 
admitted to texting an image of his intimate body parts to a thirteen-year 
old student.180  This teacher was sentenced to probation and received a 
suspended sentence, where he was required to undergo a mental health 
evaluation.181   
 
[43] Furthermore, in 2009 a fifty-year teacher in New Jersey was 
“charged with endangering the welfare of a child after allegedly sending 
sexually explicit texts, emails and images to a 15-year-old student.”182  
During that same year, a teacher in Pennsylvania was charged with 
transmitting “sexual messages and a picture of a woman exposing her 
breasts to the 16-year old boy’s cell phone.”183   
 
[44] As these sexting incidents continue to increase, school districts will 
likely move toward permitting searches of teachers’ cell phones, 




                                                
180 See Ann Doss Helms, Former Teacher Admits Sexting Middle Schooler, Mother of 13-
Year-Old Found Explicit Photo on Girl’s Phone. Man Gets Suspended Sentence., 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Apr. 8, 2010, available at http://www.charlotteobserver.com/ 
2010/04/08/1363303/former-teacher-admits-sexting.html. 
 
181 See id. 
 
182 Loren Fisher, Bridgewater-Raritan High School Teacher Charged with ‘Sexting’ Teen 
Student, FLEMINGTON INJERSEY (Oct. 25, 2009, 3:32 PM), http://flemington.injersey.com 
/2009/10/25/bridgewater-raritan-high-school-teacher-charged-with-sexting-teen-student/. 
 
183 Justin Vellucci, Butler Senior High School Teacher Accused of ‘Sexting’ Student, 
PITT. TRIB. REV., May 19, 2009, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/ 
pittsburghtrib/news/regional/s_625734.html. 
 
184 For more accounts, see School Employees Arrested for Sexual Crimes, 
TEACHERCRIME.COM, http://www.teachercrime.com/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2010).  While 
it is unclear whether all of the examples above involved employer-provided cell phones, 
all of them could play out with employer-provided cell phones.  See, e.g., id.  
Consequently, it is important to know what the implications of the Supreme Court’s 
decision are for searching employer-provided devices, since an increasing number of 
schools provide such devices to their employees. 
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VII.  IMPLICATIONS 
 
[45] The Quon case highlights several important principles related to 
employer-conducted workplace searches.  One of these is the continuing, 
foundational principle that employers do not need probable cause or a 
warrant before searching employer-provided cell phones.185  Beyond this 
foundational principle, employers will be well advised to comply with 
both the principles the Court highlighted in the O’Connor plurality, and in 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence.186   
 
[46] Following the Court’s reasoning in Quon, it is safe to assume that 
teachers have a reasonable expectation of privacy at work.187  As a 
consequence of this assumption, and under the O’Connor plurality 
approach, school districts seeking to conduct work-related investigatory 
searches or searches for non-investigatory ends, must satisfy the two-step 
standard: (i) the search must be justified at its inception; and (ii) the 
conducted search must be reasonable in scope to the objectives of the 
justified search without being excessively intrusive.188  
  
[47] School districts must be aware of the fact that courts will examine 
the intent of the cell phone audit in order to determine if the first step is 
satisfied.189  If the intent of the search is a legitimate work-related intent, 
the school district is likely to pass muster under the first step.190  In Quon 
for example, the Court found the search of the text messages justified at 
inception because it was intended to ensure that employees were not 
paying for work-related text messages or that the employer was not paying 
                                                
185 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2628, 2630 (2010). 
 
186 See supra Part III.  This is critical because, as emphasized above, the Court chose not 
to determine whether the plurality opinion or Justice Scalia’s approach should control in 
this matter.  See supra Part III.  
 
187 See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630. 
 
188 See id.  
 
189 See id. at 2631. 
 
190 See id. 
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for personal text messages  – “a legitimate work-related rationale.”191  If 
schools similarly have such work-related rationale or if the search is 
“necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose,” the search would 
likely satisfy the first step.192  Other rationales include audits pursuant to 
performance evaluations, audits necessary for litigation about the legality 
of government actions and possibly even audits designed to comply with 
state open records laws.193  
  
[48] For school districts to satisfy the second step, they need to show 
that the cell phone audit is reasonably related to the intent of the search.194  
In Quon, the court found the cell phone audit to be an “expedient” and 
“efficient” means toward the intent of the search.195  There is nothing in 
the Court’s opinion to suggest that school district cell phone audits would 
not be upheld if districts choose to examine transcripts and records of text 
messages for a similar end as in Quon.196  To strengthen its litigation 
position in Fourth Amendment challenges to cell phone audits, it would be 
prudent for districts to prepare and preserve clear documentation showing 
that each cell phone audit conducted is an “expedient” and “efficient” 
means to the ends of the search.197  
  
[49] Additionally, under the second step, in order to pass muster, 
searches must not be “‘excessively intrusive.’”198  According to the Court, 
the search in Quon was not “‘excessively intrusive’” because the OPD 
only reviewed two months of text messages as opposed to all months in 
                                                




193 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2629. 
 
194 See id. at 2630. 
 
195 See id. at 2631. 
 
196 See id. 
 
197 See id. 
 
198 See id. (quoting O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987)). 
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which Quon incurred overages.199  The search was also not excessively 
intrusive because the OPD redacted text messages Quon sent while he was 
off duty.200  Similarly, in reviewing transcripts of text messages, school 
districts would be wise to redact messages sent by teachers while off duty 
or to build in other controls to protect such messages from the audit.  
  
[50] An employer can diminish the intrusiveness of a search by clearly 
forewarning employees that employer-provided cell phones are subject to 
audit.201  Such warnings would serve to reduce employees’ expectations of 
privacy for, as the Court stated, “the extent of an expectation is relevant to 
assessing whether the search was too intrusive.”202   
 
[51] School districts also should implement a clear policy on teacher 
cell phone searches and have employees sign a statement acknowledging 
receipt and understanding of the policy; this would further ensure a 
diminution of teachers’ privacy expectations.203  To maintain the validity 
of such a policy, the school district should train school administrators on 
how to implement the district policy and clearly inform them not to 
circumvent the official policy.  Additionally, the school district should tell 
administrators not to grant ad hoc exceptions to the audit requirements in 
                                                
199 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2631 (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 726).  However, the Court 
noted that the OPD might have had reasonable grounds to search text messages for all 
months in which Quon incurred overages.  Id.  In other words, the court will not likely 
deem a school district cell phone audit of all months pertinent to the audit to be 
excessively intrusive as long as the district has reasonable grounds.  See id.  In all, school 
districts are welcome to limit their review to “a large enough sample” of the months 




201 See id. 
 
202 Id. (citing National Treasury Emps. Unions v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671 (1989); 
cf. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-57 (1995) (explaining that 
student athletes have a lower privacy expectation because of the required changing in 
public locker rooms and preseason physical examinations)). 
 
203 See id. at 2631-32. 
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the policy, similar to the one that ostensibly occurred with the OPD 
supervisor’s statement to Quon.204  
  
[52] Further, the very fact that the cell phone is an employer-provided 
device also diminishes the privacy expectation of teachers.205  The Court 
declared that searches of “employer-provided” cell phones are “not nearly 
as intrusive as a search” of personal cell phones or e-mail accounts, or 
wiretapping of home phones.206  School districts should recognize that a 
court does not render a search excessively intrusive simply because it 
reveals “intimate details” of the teacher’s personal life, particularly where 
the district has made reasonable efforts to avoid intrusion on such 
details.207  School districts could also take solace in the fact that they are 
not required to resort to the least-restrictive means when seeking to audit 
teacher cell phones.208  Indeed, as noted earlier, the Court rejected the 
Ninth Circuit’s requirement of a “least-restrictive means” approach.209  
  
[53] Under Justice Scalia’s O’Connor approach, which was reiterated in 
Quon, the Fourth Amendment would apply as a general matter to searches 
of public school teachers.210  Moreover, the same standard of 
reasonableness would apply to private employer and public employer 
                                                
204 See id. at 2625 (“Duke [the OPD supervisor] said, however, that it was not his intent 
to audit [an] employee’s text messages to see if the overage [was] due to work related 
transmissions.  Duke suggested that Quon could reimburse the City for the overage fee 
rather than have Duke audit the messages.  Quon wrote a check to the City for the 
overage.  Duke offered the same arrangement to other employees who incurred overage 
fees.”) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted) (second and third 
alteration in original). 
 
205 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2631-32. 
 
206 Id. at 2631. 
 
207 See id. at 2631-32. 
 
208 See id. at 2632. 
 
209 See id.  
 
210 See id. at 2632-33; see also id. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
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searches.211  If school districts can show, as the OPD did in Quon, that the 
search has a legitimate work-related intent and is not excessively intrusive, 




[54] As highlighted earlier, even after Quon, uncertainty remains in the 
workplace-cell phone-search jurisprudence as the Court itself readily 
acknowledged.213  Consequently, going forward, schools must proceed 
cautiously pursuant to both the Scalia and O’Connor plurality approaches 
discussed above to minimize their legal exposure.  As teacher sexting, as 
well as public employee sexting, continues to increase on employer-
provided devices, it is uncertain how the lower courts will interpret and 
apply the Quon decision and the Supreme Court might be forced to revisit 
the issue in the future and to make a choice between the plurality and 
Justice Scalia’s O’Connor approaches.  As Justice Scalia aptly observed: 
 
Despite the Court’s insistence that it is agnostic about the 
proper test, lower courts will likely read the Court’s self-
described “instructive” expatiation on how the O’Connor 
plurality’s approach would apply here (if it applied), as a 
heavy-handed hint about how they should proceed.  
Litigants will do likewise, using the threshold question 
whether the Fourth Amendment is even implicated as a 
basis for bombarding lower courts with arguments about 
employer policies, how they were communicated, and 
whether they were authorized, as well as the latest trends in 
employees’ use of electronic media. In short, in saying why 
it is not saying more, the Court says much more than it 
should.214  
                                                
211 See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).  
 
212 See id. 
 
213 See id. at 2630; supra part III. 
 
214 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2635 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).  
